This paper argues that the profitability of momentum strategies can be tied to the dynamics of firm-specific factors. We frame our argument within a model and test its predictions. We show that momentum can exist when the log market value of equity is increasing and convex (or decreasing and concave) with respect to the log price of the commodity produced by the firm. The addition of growth options will increase the convexity, and thus the profits from a momentum strategy. Costs, on the other hand, decrease convexity and lower momentum. The first contribution of this paper is that our model produces testable hypotheses that are largely borne out in the data. The most convincing evidence in favor of our theory is that, as predicted by the model, a momentum strategy implemented in a subsample of low costleverage or high market-to-book firms produces significantly greater returns than a momentum strategy implemented in a subsample of high cost-leverage or low market-to-book firms. The second contribution of this paper is that it ties the microeconomics of the firm to asset pricing. Although momentum might arise under different scenarios, we argue and present evidence that it can be traced directly to firm-specific factors.
Introduction
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) claim that it is profitable to buy stocks with previously high returns (winners) and sell stocks with previously low returns (losers) -a result that at first blush appears to violate the notion that past stock returns should not forecast future stock returns. The authors' findings have sparked a heated debate among financial economists as to the reasons behind the profitability of such an investment strategy (a phenomenon that is also known as stock return momentum, return momentum, or simply momentum). Are the returns "anomalies" that can be exploited for a profit? Are the returns the result of behavioral biases? Or, can 'momentum profits' be understood in terms of a risk-return tradeoff?
The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) have not disappeared since the original paper. Rather, additional evidence has been found in out-of-sample studies. Rouwenhorst (1998 Rouwenhorst ( , 1999 ) finds a similar pattern of returns in international stocks while Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document that buying past winners and selling past losers continues to produce positive returns over the 1990 to 1998 period.
In this paper, we explore the conditions under which high returns are followed by higher expected returns. We do this by providing a simple model of a firm that produces a single good. If the log price of the commodity follows a mean reverting process then the log market value of equity will be increasing and convex with respect to the log price of the commodity. Since the factor loading (beta) of the firm is the derivative of the log-market value with respect to the factor (or log-commodity price in this case), convexity, along with a positive risk premium, implies that higher returns will be followed by higher expected returns. The addition of growth options serves to increase the convexity. Conversely, extremely high costs or leverage may reverse the convexity.
Our model produces a number of testable hypotheses. A momentum strategy implemented in a subsample of high sales-convexity firms produces greater returns than a momentum strategy implemented in a subsample of low-convexity firms. Although it is difficult to measure convexity directly by using firm level data, as noted above, costs are associated with low or negative convexity while strategic options are associated with high convexity. Our tests show that momentum strategies of low cost-leverage and high market-to-book firms out-perform momentum strategies of high cost-leverage and low market-to-book firms. In fact, we find no discernible momentum profit in a subsample of firms with low market-to-book ratios -all momentum profits come from high market-to-book firms. The latter is strong evidence that perceived growth options and cost leverage play an important role in explaining momentum profits. Aside from providing evidence in support of our model, the results based on market-to-book ratios and costs challenge behavioral explanations of momentum profitability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews theories and past studies on stock return momentum. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 presents empirical tests and results, and Section 5 concludes.
Existing theories and studies on stock return momentum
Existing theories on the profitability of momentum strategies can be broadly divided into two camps: "behavioral" explanations and "rational" models. This paper focuses exclusively on the latter. 1 We begin this section by enumerating the three reasons (or channels) why momentum might rationally exist. We then discuss each channel and review associated literature.
Consider an N -factor model of returns:
r j,t = β j,1,t λ 1,t + ... + β j,N,t λ N,t + β j,1,tf1,t + ... + β j,N,tfN,t
wherer j,t is the excess return of stock j at time t, β j,1,t is the factor loading of stock j on the first factor at time t, λ 1,t is the risk premium earned for holding the first factor at time t, andf 1,t is the (mean-zero) excess return of the first factor at time t. The model serves as a useful reference for discussing rational explanations for stock return momentum.
Rational Channels for Observed Stock Return Momentum
Channel 1: Static, cross-sectional differences in expected returns Channel 2: Dynamic (time-varying) factor risk premia (e.g., λ n,t ) Channel 3: Dynamic (time-varying) factor loadings (e.g., β j,n,t )
The first channel for momentum can be described as one that arises from factor loadings (i.e., β j,n,t ) that vary across firms but not over time. Momentum strategies are profitable because the long side of the portfolios selects high expected return firms while the short side contains mostly low expected return firms. The second channel can arise from autocorrelated risk factors (we give an example of this shortly). The third channel results from time-varying factor loadings that is synonymous with curvature in the log-value function of the firm.
There are a couple of points worth noting. The first channel relies on constant, yet crosssectionally disperse, expected returns to generate momentum while the second and third channels rely on time-varying expected returns. The difference between the second and third channels is only in the source of the time variation. The first and third channels derive from the microeconomics of the firm. In contrast, the second channel hypothesizes a macroeconomic structure to factor risk premia. Finally, note that existence of the third channel may give rise to the first channel. That is, time-varying factor loadings at the firm level can also lead to cross-sectional differences in expected returns.
Channel 1:
The first channel for momentum is one that takes advantage of persistent crosssectional differences in expected returns (static β j,n,t ). To understand this channel, consider a world with two firms. One firm has high expected returns, E[r High ], and the other has low expected returns, E[r Low ]. Consider an observation period, ∆, during which expected returns do not change (e.g., a quarter). Let the probability that the high expected return firm actually earns a higher return over the observation period be denoted by P (∆) and assume P (∆) > 1/2. We now employ a momentum strategy that is long on whichever firm has higher returns over the past observation period (the "winner") and short the other firm (the "loser"). The winner is not necessarily the firm with high expected returns due to idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, the expected return of our momentum strategy is:
where E[Π W −L ] denotes the expected return (or profit) to buying past winners and selling past losers.
Conrad and Kaul (1998) advocate Channel 1 as the source of observed momentum. In addition, Grundy and Martin (2001) assume static factor loadings in their analysis. However, they show that static loadings on a market and Fama-French size factor cannot completely account for momentum profits. Moreover, there is evidence at the industry level that Channel 1 cannot fully explain the observed momentum in stock prices. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) can't reject the null hypothesis that the unconditional excess returns (and abnormal returns) are the same across twenty industry groups. However, the authors show that conditionally there is a persistent momentum effect at the industry level even after adjusting for risk. The difference between the unconditional and conditional findings provide extremely strong support for time varying expected returns (and therefore Channel 2 or Channel 3). In other words, assuming a rational framework applies, observed momentum must come from either time varying risk premia or time varying factor loadings.
Channel 2:
The second channel attributes time-varying expected returns to time-varying risk premia. If this channel is to explain momentum, then from (1) we see that serial correlation in risk factors (f n,t ) leads directly to serial correlation in returns. For another example, assume that crude oil has an unconditional risk premium of zero. Suppose, however, that excess returns on oil futures follow a moving average process:
where ε t is an iid zero-mean random variable and 0 < θ < 1. Although the unconditional mean of this process is zero, returns to oil show momentum in the sense that a positive unexpected shock today implies a higher risk premium tomorrow. Moreover, any firm whose value is non-trivially correlated with the returns of oil futures will experience a momentum component in its returns.
To lend credence to Channel 2, one ought to find some autocorrelation in macroeconomic factors (such as oil or other commodity shocks). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report that they found no such structure in the "usual" variables used to explain cross sectional stock returns (i.e., the Fama-French factors). On the other hand, Chordia and Shivakuma (2000) use the term spread, default spread, dividend yield, and yield on the three-month T-bill to calculate expected returns. By using these variables, the authors claim that momentum profits are completely explained. Chordia and Shivakuma (2000) conclude -as does this paper -that the apparent profitability of momentum strategies is compensation for bearing time-varying risk, but they only provide circumstantial evidence that risk premia for macroeconomic risk are time varying.
Channel 3: The third channel hypothesizes that time-varying expected returns are the result of time-varying factor loadings. To understand this channel, we consider a stylized example similar to the one above. This time, however, assume that an increase (decrease) in unexpected returns causes an increase (decrease) in expected returns. If a firm happens to be a "winner" its expected return increases to E[r] + ξ. If it is a "loser" its expected return decreases to E[r] − ξ. Note that these changes lead directly to cross sectional differences in the expected returns of firms, and thus will contribute indirectly to momentum through the first channel. Following the same logic as in the first example, the profits to a momentum strategy will be: expected returns. 2 Like this paper, the author identifies the convex curvature of the log market value of equity function (with respect to dividend growth rates) as a key component to observed momentum. Johnson (2000) succeeds in calibrating his model to some existing stylized facts but does not provide testable hypotheses. Finally, Bakshi and Chen (2001) , model firms in the same spirit as Johnson (2000) but are more concerned with firm specific valuation rather than the analysis of portfolio strategies.
A real-options model of the firm
In what ensues, we model a single firm and abstract from competitive effects. We specifically account for the third momentum channel, and in so doing, also provide a rationale for how the first channel can arise. 3 Our goal is to separately assess the impact of different value and cash flow constituents (e.g., sales, costs, interest expenses, and growth options) on expected returns. We begin by deriving a general result that is necessary and sufficient for the third momentum channel to exist (in expectation) in a continuous time diffusion economy. We then specialize to specific processes and relate observable firm variables to the third channel. This last step allows us to make empirical predictions.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the third momentum channel in a continuous time diffusion economy
We make the following assumptions:
1. all uncertainty pertaining to the firm can be modeled as a diffusion process 2. the firm has a perpetual right, but not an obligation, to generate cash flows by means of its production technology as long as it can pay interest expenses and the fixed and variable costs associated with production 3. firms are perfectly competitive (non-strategic); markets are frictionless and arbitrage free; there is no asymmetry of information in the economy Given the above assumptions, the market value of equity (V t ) of the firm satisfies a set of differential equations of the following form:
Where X t is a vector of n macroeconomic variables that affect firm cash flows and the cost of capital. µ * t is a vector of risk adjusted drifts. c * t is the endogenously determined firm's cash flow. 4 And, r t is the prevailing risk-free rate. X t , after risk adjustment, evolves as,
where W t is a vector of Brownian variates.
The date t expected total instantaneous returns of the firm depend on the expected change in the value of the firm due to changes in the economic conditions (e.g., capital gains) as well as the cash flows from current operations:
From Itô's Lemma, this is:
where µ t is the unadjusted drift of X t . We simplify (8) using (5) to:
where v t ≡ ln V t . Eqn. (9) can also be derived more intuitively by considering a firm that is a portfolio of factor mimicking assets (i = 0, ..., n) with asset i = 0 corresponding to the risk free asset, and asset i > 0 having log-price X i t . Each of the ∂vt ∂X i t 's can thus be interpreted as one of the factor loadings (β j,i,t ) in Eqn. (1) with the crucial caveat that the factor loadings are now time varying. The vector of risk premia µ t − µ * t should likewise be identified with the risk premia λ i,t from (1). Thus, Eqn. (9) is simply the value-weighted sum of returns on the assets in the portfolio or, in other words, the total return on the portfolio.
The following proposition relates Channel 3 momentum to the curvature of the firm's logvalue: Proposition 1. Assume that µ t −µ * t is constant and that v t is a twice differentiable function of X t . The correlation between the firm value and expected returns is positive if and only if
All proofs are relegated to an appendix. 5 To illustrate the relevance of the proposition consider a firm whose value depends on only a single risk factor 6 and denote this risk factor as X and assume interest rates, r t = r, are constant. 8 We treat p t as an economic factor. Even if p t is not 'fundamental' -p t could be the log-price of sneakers -as long as p t itself has a derived constant risk premium there is no loss of generality since we are discussing a onefactor model. Suppose the firm perpetually produces a single unit of the commodity at zero cost and does not have any growth options or debt. The value of this basic firm, denoted by V B t , is simply the value of a portfolio of forwards each of which corresponds to a unit of the good that will be produced at some future date:
is the forward price for a good to be delivered at date t + τ , and is given by:
4κ The commodity price risk premium, µ − µ * , is assumed constant and positive. This is consistent with our intent to investigate Channel 3 momentum, which attributes time varying expected returns to changing factor loadings and not time varying risk premia. From Eqn. (9), the expected return for the firm is
Note that, µ − µ * and p t should be identified with µ M and X M t , respectively, as mentioned in the last subsection. It follows from the restriction in (10) that the firm will exhibit increasing expected returns if and only if
After a bit of manipulation, the firm value is calculated to be:
The factor loading or firm 'beta' is: Note that ρ(p t , s) is a probability measure (it is everywhere positive and its integral is one) so ∂v B t /∂p t is always positive. Moreover,
is equivalent to a variance, it too is always positive. Thus, in this very simple model of a firm, the expected returns of the firm increase with firm value, thereby leading to the third channel of momentum.
There are several important points to note:
1. The firm's expected returns increase with p t . The reason for this is that p t is mean reverting and NPV residing in long-term (future) cash flows is relatively insensitive to the level of p t . An increase in p t results in higher loading on near term (risky) cash flows, higher risk, and higher expected returns.
2. An empirical prediction is that a momentum strategy implemented in a subsample of firms whose log-value is convex with respect to log-sales will be more profitable than one implemented in the complementary subsample.
3. Note that the third channel effect is persistent for κ = 0, but non-persistent for κ = 0 because of the mean reversion. 9 The mean reversion is desirable since there is little evidence of unconditional cross-sectional differences among firms, as discussed earlier.
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Too much mean reversion (κ → ∞), on the other hand, leads to no change in expected returns (and no volatility in the firm value).
To summarize:
Hypothesis 1. Momentum strategies are more profitable when implemented in a subsample of firms whose convexity measure (11) is high than in a subsample of firms whose convexity is low.
9 If the firm value is not mean reverting (i.e., κ = 0) then v B t is linear in pt. This rules out the third channel. To ensure a finite firm value in this case, one needs to assume that the convenience yield is finite and positive: limκ→0 r − κµ * − σ 2 /2 > 0. 10 Our firm does not retain its earnings nor does it re-invest them. Thus, growth can come only from the exercise of growth options. The effect of these is modeled in the next subsection.
The effect of real options
The model in the last section ignores any embedded options. Options can be defensive or aggressive in nature, reflecting the ability of management to enhance growth or curtail it. It is not immediately apparent, when considering such options, how their presence contributes to the convexity measure in (11) . To investigate the impact of options, assume the options are perpetual (i.e., time independent). In this case, any option component of the firm, say V O , must obey the following ordinary differential equation:
There are two fundamental solutions, U (p) and U (−p):
The value of any option of the firm must be a linear combination of the two fundamental solutions. Only U (p t ) can be the value of a growth option, since U (−p t ) decreases with p t (i.e., decreases with cash flows). The other solution can represent the contribution of a downsizing option or the presence of limited liability. The firm value including the options is given locally 11 by:
The coefficients α and β depend on switching costs and production capacity levels as well as the liquidation level of equity. After specifying the details of the possible options available to the firm, these coefficients can be derived by satisfying the usual smooth pasting conditions.
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An argument identical to the one demonstrating that v B t in Eqn. (12) is convex also leads to the conclusion that both ln U (p t ) and ln U (−p t ) are convex. Consider the following Lemma (the proof is provided in the Appendix).
If each of v 1 and v 2 is monotonically increasing and convex functions of p t then:
11 By locally, we mean that α and β are constant only over a closed interval pt ∈ [p n , p n ], where n indexes a production capacity level. This will become clearer in Section 3.5 where we provide an explicit example.
12 See, for instance, the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) mine. For our current purposes, the particular endogenous nature of the solution for the coefficients is not relevant enough to warrant a detailed analysis. Suffice it to say that α corresponds to the magnitude of the growth option while β describes that of the downsizing option. For the sake of completeness, we later provide an explicit example of a firm with growth and downsizing options.
Now, assume that the firm is not distressed and thus the downsizing option (i.e., βU (−p t )) is relatively small. In this regime
Since both the growth option (i.e., U (p t )) and V B t are monotonically increasing and convex functions of p t , Lemma 1 implies that V B t + αU (p t ) will still have a positive measure of convexity. 13 In addition, for all reasonable parameter choices it turns out that Convexity(U(pm)) Convexity(V B t (pm)) 1, where p m denotes the value of p t at its median.
14 This is also borne out in our empirical work, in that we find that conditioning on the degree of cash flow mean reversion is not an important determinant of momentum profitability, whereas conditioning on the presence of option value is extremely important. In other words, mean reversion in firm cash flows (e.g., sales and EBITDA) contributes less to firm convexity than does the presence of growth options.
Lemma 1 says that the convexity measure of V B t + αU (p t ) is at least as great as a weighted average of convexity(V B t ) and convexity(U (p t )) (where the weight is proportional to the value weight). Thus as the growth option increases in value, in relative terms, the convexity measure for V W O increases towards convexity(U (p t )).
If the firm is distressed, so that the downsizing option dominates, the convexity measure may be reduced. Little can be said, however, about its dynamics without making further assumptions. We summarize the insights of this section with our next empirical prediction:
Hypothesis 2. Firms with high market-to-book ratios, reflecting valuable options, exhibit higher convexity measures (11), ceteris paribus. Thus, a subsample of high market-to-book firms will exhibit greater momentum profits than a subsample containing low market-to-book firms.
The effect of leverage
To examine a more realistic model of a firm it remains to add negative cash flows or costs.
15
Upon adding constant costs (K) to the instantaneous cash flows, the firm value has the 13 These results do not change when κ → 0.
14 By reasonable parameter choice we mean r ∼ 1 − 4%, σ ∼ 10 − 100%, κ ∼ 5 − 50% and µ − µ * ∼ 4 − 8%. 15 Interest payments are a cost to equity.
following form
The constant costs enter the value function in the form of a perpetuity. 16 We therefore do not distinguish between interest expense, fixed costs and variable costs. The combined present value of these costs is incorporated in the
If, neglecting costs, the convexity measure is positive, then with costs the total firm value will have a positive convexity measure if and only if
/∂p t The right hand side of the equation will always be positive so the restriction is not trivial. Define:
One sees that firms with high cost leverage, will not exhibit a positive measure of convexity, and perhaps be characterized by strong short term reversion.
As for intermediate values of cost leverage, it is not clear how a local increase in costs will affect the convexity measure. To see this, consider an example in which the underlying log-price is a random walk with drift, κ = 0, lim κ→0 κµ = r − δ − σ 2 2 and the constant proportionate convenience yield is δ. The firm value when it is producing and selling its output is
+ 2r σ The sign of the convexity measure depends on
The main points to be observed from this complicated expression are that as sales fall (i.e., the limit p t → −∞), and the downsizing option becomes more valuable, the expression will turn negative. 17 On the upside, the presence of growth options (the e γ 1 pt term) implies that the convexity measure is positive as the expansion option becomes more valuable (i.e., the limit p t → ∞). In the intermediate region, it is possible for momentum to be positive or negative and even, over a region of p t , increasing with K. There is therefore little that can be said by way of a robust analysis except in the limiting cases. From the limiting case, however, we can deduce our final empirical prediction:
Hypothesis 3. Firms with low cost leverage exhibit higher convexity than firms with high cost leverage, ceteris paribus. Thus, a subsample of firms with low cost leverage will exhibit greater momentum profits than a subsample of firms with high cost leverage.
An explicit example
Consider a firm as modeled above that can operate in one of two modes: (i) a low production mode of one output unit per unit time, or (ii) an expanded production mode of five output units per unit time. The variable costs of production are the same at each mode. The log-price of the commodity and firm value follow the dynamics discussed in Sections 3.2-3.4. We assume the following parameterization:
30.3 savings due to downsizing 10.65 One can interpret the commodity price-process parameters as follows: the output log-price, p t , has a median value of 0.06 with an annual standard deviation of roughly 0.28. The log-price reverts to its median value with a half-life of approximately five years and the risk premium associated with the commodity price is 6%. The unconditional standard deviation of the log-price is 0.58, meaning that the long-run price (as opposed to log-price) is expected to be within 3.11 and 0.31 times its median value 95% of the time.
The firm possesses an expansion option when operating in the low production mode, and a downsizing option while operating in the high production mode. The firm value is of the form:
Note the presence of a growth option term, α 1 U (p t ) when the firm is in a low production mode. When in a high production mode, the firm only possesses a downsizing option, corresponding to the β 2 U (−p t ) term.
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There are six unknown variables for which we must solve:
The last three variables, respectively, correspond to the price at which firm equity is zero and the firm is insolvent (limited liability), the price at which the firm downsizes from the high production mode, and the price at which the firm expands to the high production mode. Smooth pasting conditions provide six equations whose solution yields the six unknowns. These equate the value functions (including transition costs and benefits) and their derivatives at the transition prices: p LL , p and p.
These equations can be solved to give 18 The term β1U (−pt) represents the value of being able to permanently cease production. Although this is essentially a put option, it is not special to equity but is inherent to any owner of the technology. Note that this is consistent with the identification of option value with high market-to-book ratio. From an accounting point of view, book equity is always positive and does not tend to zero faster than market value; thus, we would not associate the limit in which the permanent shut-down is important (i.e., financial distress) with high levels of market-to-book.
where p m = 0.06 is the median of the log-price and σ uncon ≡ σ √ 2κ
= 0.58 is the unconditional (i.e., long-run) standard deviation of the log-price. Figure 1 plots the firm's value function for the two operating modes. Price movements are shown on the horizontal axis and measured in units of unconditional standard deviations (roughly twice the annual standard deviation). Expansion from the low production mode occurs if the log-price reaches 1.6 unconditional standard deviations from the median; if a typical 'good' year corresponds to a one annual standard deviation move in commodity price, expansion typically occur after 3 consecutive good years. By analogy, downsizing typically occurs after two consecutive 'bad' years. Note the hysteresis in the firm's value function. After expanding, the price must fall far below the expansion price for the firm to downsize. Similarly, after downsizing the price must increase significantly before the firm expands. The discontinuity in the firm value function upon expansion/downsizing is due to the fact that, (i) funds must be raised (e.g., by raising equity) for expansion to take place, and (ii) a cash windfall (assumed to be a dividend distribution) takes place when the firm downsizes. Finally, it is important to observe that option value (for downsizing or expansion) is largest near the transition points (marked with large black circles). In these regions, the firm's market-to-book is expected to be high relative to other regions. Figure 2 illustrates the log-value of the firm in the two operating modes. Although it is hard to clearly discern the curvature, the firm is convex in the regions where the expansion/downsizing option value is large. Curvature is better seen in Figure 3 where the slope of the log-value is plotted (i.e., the firm's beta with respect to p t ). Here it is quite clear that risk exposure changes dramatically and quickly for firms with high expansion/downsizing option components. Moreover, the relationship between realized returns and changes in expected returns is positive (thus enhancing profits from momentum portfolios). By contrast, the same relationship is negative for firms in distress or those without a significant option component (i.e., low market-to-book). Risk increases for the low production firm as its unexercised expansion option grows more valuable; risk decreases for the high production firm as its down-sizing option grows more valuable. 19 Note, finally, that the figure is calibrated so that (i) the firm is not as risky when it is large as when it is small, and (ii) on average, firms with high market-to-book ratios have lower risk than those with low market-to-book. In the context of this example, the reason that momentum strategies are more profitable in subsamples of high market-to-book firms is that there is greater convexity and cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns within such a subsample.
A natural question is whether the convexity associated with v B t (i.e., the basic firm without options or costs) is enough to drive the dispersion in expected returns. as a function of (p t − p m )/σ uncon . As can be gleaned from the figure, too little or too much mean reversion leads to a flat risk profile (i.e., no convexity). The largest dispersion in factor exposure that can be achieved (with σ = 0.30 and r = 0.06) corresponds to κ = 0.134 and is associated with relatively small levels of risk exposure. Thus, in the absence of growth/downsizing options we expect no discernible Channel 3 momentum.
Methodology and Results
Our real-options model produces three testable hypotheses. In this section, we explicitly test these hypotheses using historical, firm-level data and historical stock market data.
Data
We obtain quarterly sales, cost of goods sold, EBITDA, interest expense, and book value of equity from the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset for all available companies over the time period 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4. We would prefer monthly data in order to match existing studies of momentum but are limited by the frequency of reporting requirements in the United States. From the CRSP monthly dataset, we extract monthly returns, stock prices, and shares outstanding for all available companies from 1963:Jan to 1999:Dec. We use the monthly returns to calculate quarterly returns for each company. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying stock price by the number of shares outstanding at the end of each quarter. 19 After downsizing the firm receives the low production technology plus cash. It is the cash component that makes the firm 'safer' after downsizing. Because the cash is immediately distributed as a dividend to shareholders, the firm value (which is cum dividend) undergoes a jump in risk.
Sorting and testing methodology
Our tests consist largely of conditional sorts. At each date, firms are sorted into bins based on one or two criteria. A time series of (future) returns is then calculated for the firms in each bin. The return to a single-sort momentum strategy is defined as the return of the top bins minus the return of the bottom bins. When we sort by two criteria, we measure the difference of two momentum strategies: one implemented when the first criterion is "high" and one implemented when the first criterion is "low".
Single-sort procedure: Every quarter, firms are ranked from highest to lowest according to a single criterion (e.g., returns, sales, or EBITDA). Firms are then divided into twenty bins based on this ranking (each bin contains 5% of the stocks). The holding period (future) return of each bin is calculated as the value-weighted return of the firms in the bin. The average return of the top "N" bins ("winners") minus the average return of the bottom "N" bins ("losers") is called the return to the momentum portfolio or holding period return. Our choice of twenty bins in the single-sort procedure is similar to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) . By value-weighting within a given bin, we make sure our results are not overly influenced by small-firms. Readers who are familiar with the momentum literature can consider our portfolios to be based on one-quarter formation periods (sorted by some criterion) with one-quarter holding periods.
An example: sorting firms based on past returns. Firms are divided into twenty bins based on their past returns. A single-sort with N = 3 indicates we are concentrating on firms in the top three bins and the bottom three bins. The return to each bin (1, 2, 3, 18, 19, and 20) is calculated by value weighting the future returns of stocks in each of the bins. We then define the return to buying the "winners" as the average return of bins 1, 2, and 3. The return of the "losers" is the average return of bins 18, 19, and 20. The top three bins correspond to the top 15% of stocks as ranked by past returns (our single-sort criterion in this example). The bottom three bins correspond to the bottom 15% of stocks. A momentum strategy is implemented by forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Double-sort procedure: Each quarter, firms are ranked according to a "first criterion" (e.g., convexity, market-to-book, or costs). The ranking assigns firms to one of four quartiles. We consider the first criterion to be 'high' if a firm is in the top "P" quartiles (either top quartile or top two quartiles). We consider the first criterion to be 'low' if a firm is in the bottom "P" quartiles (either bottom quartile or bottom two quartiles).
Within each quartile, firms are ranked from highest to lowest according to a "second criterion" (e.g., returns, sales, or EBITDA). Firms are divided into twenty bins based on the second criterion ranking (within each quartile). The holding period (future) return of each of the eighty bins is calculated as the value-weighted return of the firms in the respective bin.
The return to the 'high' momentum portfolio is calculated using bins from the top "P" quartiles (P = 1 or 2). We average the returns of the top "N" bins ("winners") from each of the top "P" quartiles and subtract the average return of the bottom "N" bins ("losers") from each the top "P" quartiles. This strategy is effectively long N P bins and short N P bins. The return to the 'low' momentum portfolio is calculated in a similar manner but uses only bins in the bottom "P" quartiles.
An example: sorting firms based on past market-to-book ratios and past returns. Firms are divided into four quartiles based on their past market-to-book ratios. Within each quartile, firms are then divided into twenty bins based on their past returns. A double-sort with P = 2, N = 3 indicates we are looking at firms in the top/bottom two quartiles and the top/bottom three bins. Within each quartile, the return to each bin (1, 2, 3, 18, 19, and 20) is calculated by value weighting the future returns of stocks in the bins. When the market-to-book to book ratio is 'high', we define the return to buying the "winners" as the average return of bins 1, 2, and 3 from quartile 1 and bins 1, 2, and 3 from quartile 2 (six bins altogether). The return of the "losers" is the average return of bins 18, 19, and 20 from quartile 1 and bins 18, 19, and 20 from quartile 2. A momentum strategy for 'high' market-to-book firms is implemented by forming a portfolio that is long the winners (from quartiles 1 and 2) and short the losers (also from quartiles 1 and 2). A momentum strategy for 'low' market-to-book firms is implemented in much the same way except winners and losers only come from quartiles 3 and 4.
The goal of the double-sort methodology is to test whether momentum profits formed when the first criterion is 'high' are significantly different from momentum profits formed when the first criterion is 'low'. Existing studies of momentum typically rely on a single-sort methodology and use returns as the sole sorting criterion. There are, however, three well-known studies that employ a double-sort methodology: Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) . A key difference between our study and these studies is that the three other studies employ independent double sorts. By contrast, we use conditional double sorts that ensure an equal number of firms in each bin. The conditional double sort methodology allows us to compare similar momentum strategies (and profits) after conditioning on other variables.
Testing methodology: One way to test for time-varying factor loadings is to assume an explicit factor model and test whether or not loadings change over time. While such an approach has initial appeal, specifying a particular factor model exposes the methodology to a plethora of criticism (e.g., dual-hypothesis testing problem). Academics currently debate what is the correct model for specifying returns (i.e., Fama-French three-factor, Carhart four-factor, etc.). Because we don't want our results to fall into this debate, we adopt an alternative approach. Our hypotheses rely only on weak assumptions about an equilibrium pricing model. Namely, we only assume that, on average, firms' cash flows bear a positive risk premium. As mentioned earlier, we believe this is true for most firms. 20 We provide a battery of tests from a number of different angles. In the end, we believe our empirical results support the theory presented in the first half of this paper.
Return momentum and conditioning on cash flows
Return momentum: We begin by confirming that momentum is present in our sample of quarterly data. Table 1A show the results of a single sort procedure. In Panel A, firms are ranked by current returns (quarter "t") and sorted into bins. The future, one quarter return (over quarter "t+1") of a portfolio long in the top "N" bins and short in the bottom "N" bins is shown as the holding period return. We annualize this number for convenience. Panel A, shows that winners in the top three bins (N = 3 or top 15%) out perform losers by 1.93% per quarter or 7.96% per annum. This result is statistically significant (t = 2.17). If we look at the momentum profits from a portfolio long in the top two bins and short in the bottom two bins (N = 2), the return increases to 2.64% per quarter or 11.00% per annum (t = 2.71).
Panel B shows returns to momentum portfolios based on sorting on last quarter's returns (quarter "t-1"). The returns are between 2.72% and 3.89% per quarter (11.33% and 16.50% per annum). Again, these results are statistically significant.
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Cash flow momentum: Our single factor model relates risk to past performance, conditioning on convexity. Typical momentum strategies identify performance with returns. 20 There are likely not enough firms for which the assumption is not true to allow for power in a test that, in addition to all the other conditioning information we use, also conditions on the sign of a firm's risk premium. 21 The results are comparable in magnitude to past studies, however using quarterly data does not allow us to replicate the past studies exactly (since the past studies use monthly data and overlapping investment strategies).
Performance, however, can also be measured with respect to cash flow variables. For instance, in our single factor model cash flows can be equivalently identified with sales (e pt ) or earnings (e pt − K), per unit output. We explore our model predictions with respect to cash flow variables in another part of the paper. In this section, we first document the profits to 'momentum' strategies based on past cash flows in order to compare with related literature (Chan et. al. (1996) and Lakonishok et. al. (1994) ).
Although output prices and earnings per unit output are not observable with sufficiently high frequency (if at all), cash flow from sales and EBITDA are readily available. For empirical testing we therefore choose to look at normalized figures of actual sales and EBITDA as measures of the cash a firm receives for selling its products. We choose not to look at net income and other items further down the income statement since these measures can more easily be contaminated by capital structure and discretionary accounting choices.
22 Later, we look at the effect of leverage on the cash flow received by equity holders.
In documenting the profitability of cash flow momentum strategies, we employ a single-sort procedure. The first step is to normalize cash flow measures. In the case of sales, we choose to normalize by own-firm past sales. 23 In the case of EBITDA we normalize by the standard deviation of EBITDA over the past four quarters. 24 There are actually two ways to carry out the normalization. The first simply compares sales in the current quarter with sales in the previous quarter.
Normalized Sales t = Sales t − Sales t−1 Sales t−1
Since the above measure does not take into account the fact that many companies are subject to seasonality in their cash flows, we also calculate a year-on-year (or seasonal) measure.
Seasonally Normalized Sales t = Sales t − Sales t−4 Sales t−4
We also use two earnings measure:
22 We would like to use operating cash flow as a third (and obvious) measure of cash flow, but this item is underrepresented in the data. Operating cash flow has approximately two-thirds less data than sales or EBITDA. 23 On the one hand we want to be able to make comparisons across firms and industries. On the other hand, we want to account for seasonality and differences in seasonality across industries. 24 It is difficult to normalize EBITDA across firms in a meaningful way. Since EBITDA can be negative, a measure similar to the one used with sales cannot be used. While normalizing by standard deviation adjusts for size, it also introduces additional measurement error.
Standardized Unexpected EBITDA t = EBITDA t − EBITDA t−4 stdev(EBITDA s − EBITDA s−4 ) t−1 (19) where stdev(·) t is calculated using the four most recent quarters. The second step in our procedure is to realize that sales over quarter 't' are not reported until sometime in quarter 't+1'. To take into account the delayed release of information, we always sort by lagged measures.
Every quarter, the single-sort procedure outlined in Section 4.2 is used to calculate the profits to a strategy that pre-sorts on lagged sales. Table 1B presents our results when using lagged normalized sales. Panel A shows the average one-quarter returns for (cash flow) momentum portfolios, when sorting on the first measure of normalized sales. The profits are between 1.05% and 1.46% per quarter or (4.28% and 5.96% per annum). The returns are roughly half of those obtained when the single-sort procedure is applied to past returns (Table 1A) , though they are statistically significant (t between 2.88 and 3.12). Panel B of Table 1B shows the returns to (cash flow) momentum portfolios based on lagged seasonally normalized sales. The profits are between 3.93% and 4.46% per annum. The latter results are marginally significant.
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Our sales results are markedly different from those of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishney (1994) -but so are the methodologies and time horizons. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishney (1994) essentially sort firms by the weighted average of the past five years' sales growth. Firms with low, long-term sales growth actually out-perform firms with high, long-term sales growth. This, in fact, does not conflict with our model. In the example of Section 3.5, for instance, firms with consistently high sales will have expanded and be less risky than those who have experienced consistently low sales. Our measure of normalized sales is a cash flow proxy and, therefore, a short-term measure of performance. We find that over a short horizon (one quarter), an increase in sales predicts higher returns in the future. We stress that our model makes no predictions for the unconditional profitability of cash flow momentum strategies. In the context of our model, the unconditional profitability depends on the concentration of firms in different risk and convexity levels. Table 1C presents similar results using normalized EBITDA in a single-sort procedure. Here we document large returns to a cash flow momentum strategy and high degree of statistical significance. When sorting on the first measure of lagged seasonally normalized EBITDA, the average one-quarter returns to cash flow momentum portfolios are between 7.76 % and 9.05% per annum (Panel A). When sorting on lagged standardized unexpected EBITDA, the profits are between 5.56% and 6.63% per annum (Panel B). All EBITDA results are statistically significant and essentially confirm those of Chan et. al. (1996) .
To summarize, we confirm that sorting on past returns appears to have predictive power for future returns. We also show that sorting on past cash flow performance has predictive power for future returns. In fact, sorting on past EBITDA produces momentum profits of roughly the same magnitude as when sorting on past returns.
Test two: convexity
Hypothesis one states that "momentum strategies are more profitable when implemented in a subsample of firms whose convexity measure is high than in a subsample of firms whose convexity is low." To test the hypothesis we need to measure the curvature of the log-value of the firm with respect to p t . Once again, we consider sales and EBITDA as proxies for p t . We estimate the convexity of the relationship between the natural log of smoothed sales (or level of smoothed EBITDA) and the natural log of the market value of equity in a procedure outlined in Appendix B. 26 .
We use convexity as the first sorting criterion in a double-sort procedure (as described in Section 4.2) and present the results in Table 2 . For instance, the P = 2, N = 3 (top two quartiles, top/bottom three bins) strategy in Panel A results in profits of 1.09% per quarter or 4.44% per annum (statistically significant at conventional levels). The high convexity firms (top two quartiles) have an average return of 2.20% per quarter, while the low convexity firms (bottom two quartiles) have an average return of 1.11% per quarter. Strategies implemented in other quartiles yield similar results.
However, significant results are not found when EBITDA is used to calculate our convexity measure. In Table 2 , Panel B, momentum portfolios formed from high convexity firms uniformly out-perform momentum portfolios formed from low convexity firms. Unfortunately, the statistical significance of these results is only marginal. A telling feature of these tests is that direct convexity measures are invariably poorly correlated and poorly auto-correlated. For instance the autocorrelation across firms in the sales convexity measure used to construct Panel A is, for all intents and purposes, zero! We, thus, strongly suspect that our convexity measure is dominated by noise and conclude that directly measuring firm-level convexity is not feasible given available firm level data. We therefore turn to proxy measures of convexity.
Test three: market-to-book
Instead of trying to measure convexity directly, we look for proxies of convexity. Hypothesis two states that everything else being equal, 27 "firms with high market-to-book ratios ... exhibit higher convexity measures...[and thus] greater momentum profits." To test this hypothesis, we carry out a double-sort procedure (as described in Section 4.2) with a firm's lagged market-to-book ratio as the first sorting criterion. A high market to book ratio can indicate the presence of valuable growth/downsizing options. As described in Section 3, such options tend to increase the convexity of the log-value function. Table 3 presents some rather interesting results. Momentum portfolios formed from high market-to-book firms significantly outperform momentum portfolios formed from low marketto-book firms. For example, if we look at the results from a P = 2, N = 3 strategy, we see that high market-to-book firms have an average return to momentum investing of 2.34% per quarter. Low market-to-book firms have an average return of 0.03% per quarter. The difference of 2.32% per quarter or 9.60% per annum is both statistically significant (t-stat=2.77) and economically significant. The results from other combinations of quartiles and bins show a similar pattern: the difference in returns to high market-to-book momentum strategies vs. low market-to-book momentum strategies ranges from 7.88% to 18.92% per annum. Note that conditioning on the extreme market-to-book quartiles (P = 1 strategies) increases profits.
Most strikingly, almost all momentum profits come from high market-to-book firms. Low market-to-book firms exhibit no significant momentum profitability. Thus, not all momentum strategies produce profits. In fact, only momentum strategies implemented in samples of high market-to-book (high convexity) firms produce profits. The market-to-book results are perhaps the strongest evidence that firm-specific dynamics can explain the profitability of momentum strategies. They also pose a serious challenge to the behavioral interpretation of momentum profits. To our knowledge, behavioral finance does not relate the speed at which investors incorporate information to the market-to-book ratio of a firm. As we will see in the next section, there is also a relationship between costs and momentum profitability; a fact that does not readily follow from 'behavioral' theories.
Test four: costs
Hypothesis three states that everything else being equal, "firms with low cost leverage exhibit higher convexity than firms with high cost leverage...[and thus] greater momentum profits." High costs relative to cash flows tend to lower convexity even to the point at which the log-firm value becomes concave. We focus on costs borne by equity holders (i.e., those that lower cash flows to equity holders).
Our first test employs the double-sort methodology using costs of goods sold divided by sales as the first criterion. Table 4 presents our results. Consider once more the case N = 2, P = 3 (bottom two quartiles, top/bottom three bins). A momentum strategy implemented in only low cost firms has an average return of 2.15% per quarter. A momentum strategy implemented in only high cost firms has an average return of 0.67% per quarter. The difference between these two momentum strategies is 1.48% per quarter or 6.07% per annum and is statistically significant at conventional levels. Strategies implemented in other quartiles yield profits of similar magnitude. Statistical significance becomes (slightly) marginal when we use only the bottom quartile and top quartile (P = 1); this is most likely due to the fact that costs of goods sold is missing from a large number of firms in our data. Reducing the population in each of the bins inevitably leads to an increase in measurement error, and this effect is most keenly felt in the strategies that use relatively few bins.
Our second test also employs a double-sort methodology and uses a measure taken directly from (15) . For the cost flow, K we use the sum of the cost of goods sold and interest expense.
To calculate rV t we multiply the market value of equity by 0.06 (the approximate T-Bill rate over the test period). We are careful to use only lagged accounting variables since only these are available to investors at the time of portfolio formation. Table 5 shows the cost leverage results -again we focus on the P = 2, N = 3 strategy. A momentum strategy implemented in only low cost leverage firms has an average return of 2.96% per quarter. A momentum strategy implemented in only high cost leverage firms has an average return of 1.09% per quarter. The difference between these two momentum strategies is 1.87% per quarter or 7.69% per annum and is statistically significant at conventional levels. Strategies implemented in other quartiles yield profits of similar magnitude, however statistical significance becomes (slightly) marginal for similar reasons indicated above.
To summarize Table 4 and Table 5 , using either cost measure, momentum portfolios formed from low-cost firms out-perform momentum portfolios formed from high-cost firms. These results present further evidence to support our hypothesis that costs, by lowering convexity, reduce the profitability of momentum strategies.
Further Discussion
In this section we present two clarification points and additional empirical analysis. The analysis gives further insight into the anatomy of momentum profits.
Interpreting the test results: We note at this point that the hypotheses presented within the model are only valid so long as one can 'hold everything else constant' when conducting a test (i.e., by enforcing the 'ceteris paribus' in the hypotheses). This, of course, cannot be done given the limitations of our data set. It is possible, for instance, to imagine a world in which there is far greater expected return dispersion across low convexity firms than across high convexity firms; 28 in such a case, given a sufficiently large disparity in expected return dispersion, convexity effects will only attenuate but not eliminate additional profits from a low convexity momentum strategy. If, however, one was able to ascertain that there is no expected return dispersion among low convexity (low market-to-book or high cost) firms, then since expected return dispersion is necessarily implied by the presence of high convexity, the model predictions are unambiguous: high convexity firms must yield higher momentum profits.
The strength of our results lies in the fact that all three tests demonstrate that there is little return dispersion among low convexity firms, and all three indicate that there is significant expected return dispersion (and thus momentum profits) among high convexity firms.
Understanding the role of market-to-book: Some readers may confuse our use of a firm's market-to-book ratio with the Fama and French (1992) book-to-market factor. Fama and French (1992) show high book-to-market (low market-to-book) firms outperform low book-to-market (high market-to-book) firms. 29 In our tests we condition on market-tobook and essentially measure the profitability of momentum strategies holding market-tobook constant. Our results are orthogonal to those of Fama and French (1992) and can be interpreted as follows. Momentum strategies are profitable (in a rational setting) due to dispersion in expected returns that persists in the short run. Although high market-to-book firms have an average return that is lower than those for low market-to-book firms, the dispersion in expected returns among firms with high market-to-book is greater than that of their counterpart firms. Thus momentum strategies implemented in the former out-perform those implemented in the latter.
Market-to-book ratios and cash flow momentum: Table 1B and Table 1C show that a single sort on lagged sales or lagged EBITDA leads to a profitable momentum strategy. Tables 2-5 suggest that the dispersion in expected returns that gives rise to profitable momentum strategies resides solely in high convexity (market to book) firms. In a one-factor model, returns are perfectly correlated with the underlying factor. A one-factor model therefore predicts that cash flow momentum strategies are likewise only profitable among high convexity firms and there is little profitability among low convexity firms. To test this prediction, we first condition on a firm's lagged market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for convexity) before using our measure of lagged sales or lagged EBITDA as the second sorting criterion. Table 6 presents the results. Table 6 , Panel A shows the results when market-to-book is the first sorting criterion and lagged normalized sales is the second sorting criterion. For the P = 2, N = 3 portfolio, a strategy implemented in high market-to-book firms produces a return of 1.68% per quarter (top two market-to-book quartiles, top/bottom three sales bins). A strategy implemented in low market-to-book firms produces a return of only 0.52% per quarter. The difference is 1.16% per quarter or 4.73% per annum and is marginally significant. Using the more extreme top or bottom quartile produces larger return differences and higher levels of statistical significance. Note that, as predicted by the one factor model, there is little return dispersion (with respect to cash flow performance) among low market-to-book firms. Likewise, all the profitability of a sales-based momentum strategy is due to high market-to-book firms. Panel B gives similar, albeit statistically weaker, results using lagged seasonally normalized sales.
Panel C and D repeat the analysis using lagged seasonally normalized EBITDA and unexpected EBITDA. Note that, in contrast with past sales and past returns measures of performance, the expected returns dispersion among low market-to-book firms is high. This indicates one of two things: (i) earnings capture a risk component not subsumed by either past returns or sales 30 , or (ii) the earnings measures are extremely noisy. Given the additional noise supplied by the normalization in the earnings measure, we are equally inclined towards both reasons. Note that due to the high dispersion in expected returns for low market-to-book firms in Panels C and D, both the model predictions and the empirical results are ambiguous. Thus, within the context of a one factor model, sales provide a more consistent measure of cash flows than do earnings.
Return dispersion and cash flows: Our theory gives no indication as to whether the dispersion of expected returns is greater for firms experiencing positive versus negative cash flows. To further examine both the anatomy of (cash flow) momentum strategies and the shape of the log value function, we separately examine the returns of 'winners' versus 'losers' in the different market-to-book quartiles.
31 Table 7 presents our results. We focus only on N = 3 winner/loser portfolios (top/bottom three bins). In Panel A we see that returns to the winners in the highest market-to-book quartile is 3.92% per quarter. As the market-to-book ratio drops, the return to winners remains relatively constant between 3.92% and 4.17% per quarter. However, the return to the losers rises monotonically from 1.19% per quarter for the highest market-to-book firms to 4.51% per quarter for the lowest market-to-book firms. The difference over the holding period represents the return to a momentum strategy. Note that the difference declines from 2.73% per quarter (11.37% per annum) to -0.34% per quarter (-1.34% per annum) as the market-to-book ratio falls. 32 Thus there is little cross-sectional difference in expected returns across sales-winners (when differentiated by market-to-book), while high market-tobook sales-losers do very poorly relative to low market-to-book sales-losers. Table 7 shows roughly the same pattern in Panel B. That is, the top three bins of winners produce roughly the same returns regardless of market-to-book ratio, and the bottom three bins of losers have returns that increase significantly as the market-to-book ratio falls. When the cash proxy is normalized EBITDA, however, it appears that the more extreme marketto-book portfolios generate greater cash flow momentum (Panels C and D in Table 7 ). Thus, as with our other results, the anatomy of cash flow momentum for sales is different than that for earnings.
Source of convexity: Finally, readers may wonder whether the convexity of the log value function is influenced more by the structure of cash flows (e.g., mean reversion) or by the presence of growth options (e.g., high market-to-book). To address this issue, we estimate AR(1) coefficients based on recent cash flows. We then rank firms by the absolute deviation of their AR(1) coefficient from that of the median firm. Applying the double-sort methodology 31 Again, we associate market-to-book ratios with convexity. 32 Notice that the investment strategy returns 2.73%, 1.68%, 0.52%, and -0.34% can be found in Table 6 , Panel A as well. Look only at results for top 3 bins / bottom 3 bins.
does not show significantly different returns between momentum portfolios sorted by the AR(1) criterion. This points to growth/downsizing options being the dominant factor behind the convexity of the log value function. Figure 4 , discussed earlier as part of our explicit example, shows that mean reversion contributes little to convexity. Tables to support these (non) findings are available upon request.
Conclusion
This paper provides both a model and empirical evidence that explain the profitability of momentum strategies. We begin by enumerating the three rational reasons (channels) for momentum. Based on previous studies of momentum at the firm and industry level, we argue that momentum is the result of time-varying expected returns. Time-varying expected returns can result from either time-varying risk premia or time-varying factor loadings (betas). In order to explore the existence of time-varying factor loadings, we offer a simple model of a firm that produces a single good. If the log price of the commodity follows a mean reverting process then the log market value of equity will be convex with respect to the log price of the commodity. This is sufficient to induce momentum in stock returns. The addition of growth options increases the convexity measure, and thus the profitability of momentum strategies. Costs, on the other hand, decrease the convexity measure and reduce momentum profitability. Extremely high costs (distress) can reverse the profitability of the strategy.
Our theoretical model is testable with readily available data. The predictions of the model are largely borne out in our tests. According to our model, a firm's options (growth and downsizing) increase convexity while costs reduce convexity. When conditioning on marketto-book (as a proxy for high option value) and cost leverage, we find that our predictions are empirically confirmed. A one-factor model also predicts that past cash flow performance can predict expected returns when conditioning on convexity. This is confirmed for past sales but not past EBITDA.
One of the strongest results in this paper comes from first sorting on firms' costs and marketto-book ratios. Our results show that momentum profits are entirely subsumed in high market-to-book and low cost stocks. Momentum strategies implemented in low market-tobook or high cost firms are not profitable. Some behavioral theories attribute momentum in stock returns to slow incorporation of information. However, these theories do not relate information to firms' costs or market-to-book ratios. Our empirical work, by confirming the predictions of our theoretical model, presents evidence in support of time-varying factor loadings and challenges behavioral explanations of the profitability of momentum strategies.
Thus, the contributions of this paper are manifold. We first provide a model of the firm based on the dynamics of measurable firm fundamentals. Our model produces testable hypotheses, and in this regard, our model is unique in tying the microeconomics of the firm to asset pricing. Finally, in testing (and largely confirming) the model's predictions we are able to uncover new stylized facts about the anatomy of momentum strategies. Many economists have treated momentum as an economy-wide phenomenon. We argue that it can be traced directly to firm-level dynamics.
A Proofs Proof of Proposition 1:
Let DV t be the instantaneous change in V t . The corresponding change in expected returns, is
. The correlation between the two changes is positive if and only if the covariance is positive. By Itô's Lemma, the latter is
The latter expression must therefore be positive.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Assume that v 1 and v 2 are convex in p, then
The last term can be written as
The result of the Lemma follows immediately after dividing by
and a little algebra.
Appendix B A Measure of Convexity
In order to measure convexity, we consider the relationship between the market value of equity and cash flow. We use sales and EBITDA as proxies for cash flow. We describe the procedure in terms of sales here, but repeat the same procedure using EBITDA in place of sales. Three recent and contiguous quarters of data are chosen. We arrange points from highest "sales" (point "A") to lowest "sales" (point "C"). The labeling of points (A, B, or C) does not have to be chronological. High market-to-book
High market-to-book Figure 1 : Graph of the market value of the firm described in Section 3.5. The two curves correspond to the two modes of production of the firm. The horizontal axis is measured in units of (p t − p m )/σ uncon , where p m = 0.06 is the median of the log-price and σ uncon ≡ 0.58 is the unconditional (i.e., long-run) standard deviation of the log-price. High market-to-book Figure 2 : Graph of the log-market value of the firm described in Section 3.5. The two curves correspond to the two modes of production of the firm. The horizontal axis is measured in units of (p t − p m )/σ uncon , where p m = 0.06 is the median of the log-price and σ uncon ≡ 0.58 is the unconditional (i.e., long-run) standard deviation of the log-price. is the unconditional (i.e., long-run) standard deviation of the log-price.
The parameters used are: σ = 0.30, µ * = 0, µ = 0.06 and r = 0.06
Figure 5 Timeline
A figure of the timeline used in this study is presented below. Past and current sorting criteria (e.g., sales, market-to-book ratio, etc.) are used to group stocks into portfolios. The relative performance (returns) of these portfolios is measured over the future quarter. Many sorting criteria (e.g., sales, market-to-book ratio, etc.) are used at lagged values to take into account delays when releasing accounting information at the end of a given quarter. The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a single-sort methodology of returns at the firm level. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first ranked by past returns in descending order. Firms are then divided into twenty bins based on this ranking (each bin contains 5% of the stocks.) The holding period (future) return for each bin is calculated as the value-weighted return of firms in the bin. The average return of the top "N" bins ("winners") minus the average return of the lowest "N" bins ("losers") is the called the return to the momentum portfolio ("W-L"). The table shows two different sorting periods. Panel A uses returns at time "t". Panel B uses returns lagged by one quarter -at time "t-1". The holding period in both cases is three months -over quarter "t+1". The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a single-sort methodology of normalized sales at the firm level. Normalized sales in quarter "t" is defined below on the left. Seasonally normalized sales in quarter "t" is defined below on the right. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first ranked by normalized sales in descending order. Firms are then divided into twenty bins based on this ranking (each bin contains 5% of the stocks.) The holding period (future) return for each bin is calculated as the value-weighted return or firms in the bin. The average return of the top "N" bins ("winners") minus the average return of the lowest "N" bins ("losers") is the called the return to the momentum portfolio. The table shows two different sorting periods. This table takes into account that quarter "t" sales are not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, Panels A&B uses sales lagged by one quarter. The holding period is both cases is three months -over quarter "t+1". The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a single-sort methodology of normalized EBITDA at the firm level. Seasonally Normalized EBITDA in quarter "t" is defined below on the left. Standardized Unexpected EBITDA (SU_EBITDA) in quarter "t" is defined below on the right. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first ranked by normalized EBITDA in descending order. Firms are then divided into twenty bins based on this ranking (each bin contains 5% of the stocks.) The holding period (future) return for each bin is calculated as the valueweighted return or firms in the bin. The average return of the top "N" bins ("winners") minus the average return of the lowest "N" bins ("losers") is the called the return to the momentum portfolio. The table shows two different sorting periods. This table takes into account that quarter "t" EBITDA is not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, Panels A&B uses EBITDA lagged by one quarter. The holding period is both cases is three months -over quarter "t+1". The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a double-sort methodology at the firm level. We first sort firms based on the convexity measure as described in Appendix B. We then sort firms based on their past returns. Theory predicts that momentum portfolios (long past winners and short past losers) formed from high-convexity firms will out-perform momentum portfolios formed from low-convexity firms. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first sorted into convexity quartiles. Within each quartile group, we implement a momentum strategy by: i) sorting stocks into twenty bins based on past returns; and ii) forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Past winners are defined as stocks in the top "N" bins. Past losers are defined as stocks in the lowest "N" bins. The table shows results using both contemporary and lagged convexity. "High convexity" refers to the top "P" convexity quartiles, while "low convexity" refers to the bottom "P" quartiles. Panel A uses sales up to time "t-1" to form the convextity measure. Panel B uses EBITDA up to time "t-1" to form the convextity measure. The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a double-sort methodology at the firm level. We first sort firms based on their market-to-book ratios and then sort firms based on their past returns. Theory predicts that momentum portfolios (long past winners and short past losers) formed from high-market-to-book firms will out-perform momentum portfolios formed from low market-to-book firms. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first sorted into market-to-book quartiles. Within each quartile group, we implement a momentum strategy by: i) sorting stocks into twenty bins based on past returns; and ii) forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Past winners are defined as stocks in the top "N" bins. Past losers are defined as stocks in the lowest "N" bins. The table shows results using both contemporary and lagged market-to-book ratio. "High market-tobook" refers to the top "P" market-to-book quartiles, while "low market-to-book" refers to the bottom "P" quartiles. This table takes into account that quarter "t" market-to-book is not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, market-to-book is lagged by an additional quarter. The holding period is three months -over quarter "t+1". The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a double-sort methodology at the firm level. We first sort firms based on their ratio of operating costs-to-sales and then sort firms based on their past returns. Theory predicts that momentum portfolios (long past winners and short past losers) formed from low operating cost firms will out-perform momentum portfolios formed from high operating costs firms. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first sorted into operating cost quartiles. Within each quartile group, we implement a momentum strategy by: i) sorting stocks into twenty bins based on past returns; and ii) forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Past winners are defined as stocks in the top "N" bins. Past losers are defined as stocks in the lowest "N" bins. The table shows results using both contemporary and lagged operating costs. "High operating costs" refers to the top "P" quartiles, while "low operating costs" refers to the bottom "P" quartiles. This table takes into account that quarter "t" operating costs are not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, operating costs are lagged by an additional quarter. The holding period is three months -over quarter "t+1". The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a double-sort methodology at the firm level. We first sort firms based on their cost leverage and then sort firms based on their past returns. Cost leverage comes from equation 15 in the paper and is defined as the perpetuity value of interest expense and cost of goods sold divided by the market value of equity plus the same perpetuity value. Theory predicts that momentum portfolios (long past winners and short past losers) formed from low cost leverage firms will out-perform momentum portfolios formed from high cost leverage firms. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first sorted into cost leverage quartiles. Within each quartile group, we implement a momentum strategy by: i) sorting stocks into twenty bins based on past returns; and ii) forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Past winners are defined as stocks in the top "N" bins. Past losers are defined as stocks in the lowest "N" bins. The table shows results using both contemporary and lagged cost leverage. "High cost leverage" refers to the top "P" cost leverage quartiles, while "low cost leverage" refers to the bottom "P" quartiles. This table takes into account that quarter "t" cost leverage is not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, cost leverage is lagged by an additional quarter. The holding period is three months -over quarter "t+1". Table 6 Market-to-Book, Cash Flows, and Momentum The momentum portfolios are formed by employing a double-sort methodology at the firm level. We first sort firms based on their market-to-book ratios and then sort firms based on their past cash flows. As a proxy for cash flows we use normalized sales and normalized EBITDA. Each quarter -from 1963:Q1 to 1999:Q4 -firms are first sorted into market-to-book quartiles. Within each quartile group, we implement a "momentum" strategy by: i) sorting stocks into twenty bins based on past cash flow; and ii) forming a portfolio that is long the winners and short the losers. Past winners are defined as stocks in the top "N" bins after sorting by cash flow. Past losers are defined as stocks in the lowest "N" bins. The table shows results using both contemporary and lagged accounting data. "High market-to-book" refers to the top "P" market-to-book quartiles, while "low market-to-book" refers to the bottom "P" quartiles. This table adjusts for the fact that quarter "t" accounting data are not officially announced until some point in quarter "t+1". Therefore, accounting measures are lagged by an additional quarter. The holding period is three months -over quarter "t+1".
